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Alternative schools have become increasingly popular in this
country in the last few years, at least as measured by the
amount of attention focused on them by magazines and TV
networks. A whole new genre of books has emerged, too,
beginning with Paul Goodman's CompulsoryMis-Education and
followed by the Kozol-Holt-Herndon series on the failings of
most public schools. A. S. Neil's Summerhilland Maria Montessori were rediscovered; Jay Featherstone publicized the British
Infant School model; and George Dennison described his experiences with a new school for poor inner-city children.
Alternative schools began appearing as well, growing in the
last five years from perhaps twenty-five to over 600. Over 200
were founded in the past year alone,1 and these statistics do
not reflect the growing number of public schools which have
been remodeled drastically enough to deserve the label "alternative schools."
This is not to suggest that demands for alternatives to public
schools are new. Rather, there have been strong clashes between families and the state over how to educate children since
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schooling was first made compulsory in the nineteenth century. The issues involved varied as much as families do in their
notions of what values or skills to teach or of how to teach.
The state, by contract, was fairly consistent in its position of
using the public schools to further the melting pot. One language was encouraged as was the development of a uniform
curriculum which would teach all children what they would
need to know to become responsible citizens.
The biggest fight initially was over the role of religion.
Should religious values be taught in publicly funded schools?
If so, from which viewpoint? Because this second question was
so difficult to answer in our religiously pluralistic society with
its tradition of resistance to state-imposed religion, the state
adopted a hands-off policy. It did not forbid religious schools,
but it would not encourage them by supplying state funds.
The number of privately funded church-related schools grew
nonetheless, so that today most nonpublic alternative schools
are church related.2
Now even that religious compromise is challenged. While
some parents still want the opportunity to choose churchrelated schools, they also want them to provide the
same scope and quality of secular instruction as public schools.
These demands, translated into requests for more courses or
smaller classes, have forced church-related schools to hire
more lay teachers-who cost more than teaching clergy. The
clergy, too, want more pay for their labor. Costs in churchrelated schools have thus spiraled to the point where it is
becoming impossible to provide the quality demanded at a
price parents can or will pay.
Challenges to Public Schools
But the significant change in the challenge to the public
school system is not the new urgency of financial demands
from church-related schools. It is the increasing number of
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parents who are dissatisfied with public schools not for religious but for pedagogic, cultural, or political reasons. Black
parents are demanding schools that teach black history and
culture. Many want schools that will teach their children as
successfully as white children are taught. They want better
reading and math scores today and equal job success tomorrow. White parents are also complaining about course content.
Some parents of all races want schools to focus more on
personal development and fulfillment and less on preparing
children just to fit into the present job structure. Others argue
about the amount of discipline exercised. Some want a greater
racial or socioeconomic mix of students in their schools;
others, a smaller one.
These diverse complaints appear to have a common thread
that may be the real concern of most parents: individual public
schools are too insulated from the families they serve. It is
ironic that in a nation officially opposed to the evils of monopoly, particularly in the insidious guise of socialism, we have
an education system that offers no choice to most parents.
Imagine the protest if we were allowed to see only one channel
of free TV, a channel operated by the government. Yet, we
blithely require most children to spend over ten of their most
formative years in one government-operated school.
In theory, the monopoly structure should not matter where
parents can exercise some control over the school, by vote
when the next school board member is up for reelection, or by
lobbying for statutory changes in the state legislature. But in
fact such control seems sadly inadequate when compared to
the pervasive role the school plays in the lives of most children.
Parent control is almost lacking where school boards are appointed. The monopoly structure has not been widely challenged since it is by definition established to respond to the
preferences of the local majority. They select the majority of
the school board, who then impose the style of schooling
favored by the majority of all schools in the district. Only those
who differ from majority preferences in some fashion are
forced to go to a school not to their liking (unless they are
wealthy enough to move to a different district or to afford a
private school).
February 1973

177

This content downloaded from 141.161.244.115 on Tue, 01 Dec 2015 18:43:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AlternativeSchools

Traditionally most alternative school supporters have looked outside public school systems for change. Consequently
their biggest problem usually is obtaining enough money to
operate. But to the extent that parents' objections to public
schools are the result of the structure of public school systems,
it may turn out to be more feasible to make public schools
"private" than to make private schools "public."3
Currently, many educators who object to providing
vouchers or tax credits to enable parents to select "private"
alternative schools at the same time agree to the merits of
parental options within the public system.4 Either approach, of
course, will require fairly drastic changes in the way schools
are funded and students and schools paired, and for the most
part they are changes that no one person or group has the
authority to make. On the other hand, a variety of decision
makers, ranging from the local school administrators, the
school board, the city council, state education officials, the state
legislature, to the governor, can effectively veto such changes.
School boards, for example, do not have the authority in most
cases to provide public money to private alternative schools
even if they wish. In many states a constitutional amendment
would be required;5 in most others a special bill would have to
be passed by the state legislature to enable even one district to
provide public funds to even one such alternative school.
for Legislative Support
Prospects for such legislative action are dim at present,
primarily because there is not a sizable constituency committed
to supporting aid to secular alternative schools. On the other
hand, there is a large group of parents supporting aid to
church-related schools who have been very successful recently
in getting aid bills enacted. Significantly, both major party
candidates this year endorsed the concept of aid to
church-related schools. The aid bills passed to date, however,
do not proffer much help for secular alternative schools. The
amounts appropriated average less than $200 a student, which
is of little use to alternative schools which have neither a
Prospects

religious sponsor nor rich patrons to foot the rest of the bill.
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Interestingly, the Supreme Court has kept the way open for
broader financial support to alternative schools by striking
down all legislation reviewed to date on the grounds that it
violates the constitutional wall between church and state.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional two state programs that reimbursed nonpublic
schools for certain instructional costs.6 The Pennsylvania program had attempted to avoid church-state prohibitions by limiting reimbursement to instruction in courses legislatively
defined as "secular": mathematics, physical education, physical
(but not biological) sciences, and modern (but not ancient)
languages. The Rhode Island program made a similar attempt
by limiting reimbursement to the salaries of "secular" teachers,
who were defined as those who (1) taught "secular" subjects
and (2) signed a pledge that they did not teach religion. The
Court, in rejecting both attempts, affirmed that there are two
related tests that any aid program in this area must pass: (1)
the traditional secular purpose plus neutral effect standard
first enunciated

in Allen v. Board of Education,7 plus (2) the

more recent "no excessive entanglement" standard first mentioned last year in Walz v. Tax Commission.8The majority of the
Court in Lemon, affirming what may be a legal cul-de-sac,
found that the very attempts made by Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island to separate secular from sectarian costs had excessively
entangled them in the affairs of the church-related schools in
violation of the Walzstandard.
This fall the Court affirmed without opinion a lower court
decision holding unconstitutional an Ohio program which
would have reimbursed parents for up to $102 of the tuition
spent for each child in a nonpublic school.9 The lower court in
Wolman v. Essexxo emphasized that the grants went only to
nonpublic schools and that the schools were predominately of
one religious group.xx This may indicate some willingness to
distinguish aid proposals which involve all students and which
provide enough aid per student that church-related schools
need not be the primary beneficiaries. On the other hand, the
lower court asserted that the principle of the First Amendment
is to prohibit the state from providing any funds which directly
support or sponsor any church-related

institution,

adding that
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this constitutional policy does not turn on the amount of aid a
statute provides in any particular school year.12
A recent decision by a federal court in New York introduces
another possible vehicle for effectively aiding only churchrelated schools. Committeefor Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquest13upheld New York state tax credits for a
portion of the nonpublic school tuition paid on up to three
children per family, despite a dissent arguing there is no
difference between a parent's receiving a $50 reimbursement
for tuition paid to a parochial school and his receiving a $50
benefit because he sends his child to a parochial school.14 One
difference is that poor parents may not pay enough in taxes to
receive any benefit. Tax credits may thus be even more detrimental to the education of most poor children than no benefits
at all.
A critical factor in the future of nonpublic schools, therefore, will be whether the Supreme Court buys the "taxcredit-is-not-a-grant" distinction. If it does, church-related
schools may be saved and even encouraged - but probably no
others.
One hopeful sign for alternative school supporters is the
interest that has been shown in trying an education voucher
system. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) has announced its willingness to help finance voucher demonstrations in which elementary school children would have their
education financed for five or six years by allocating public
education monies to parents in the form of vouchers or grants
which could be redeemed at approved schools of their
choice.15 The presumption is that schools would become more
responsive to parents' interests in order to retain their students
and budgets. The expected shift in orientation from a supplyto a demand-centered school system should facilitate the development of alternative schools both inside and outside the
public system.
Currently Alum Rock, an elementary school district in San
Jose, California, has begun an actual test of the voucher concept. Its test is limited to public schools this first year because
the legislature failed to authorize the participation of any
180
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nonpublic schools in the test. Nonetheless, we will for the first
time have a chance to see how parents in a community respond to the possibility of choosing among different schools
for their children.
While most national education groups are on record as
opposing even a test of vouchers, some have indicated support.16 Congress has resisted vigorous lobbying efforts to stop
the OEO demonstrations. Connecticut, moreover, has passed
legislation authorizing a full test at the option of one of its
local school boards,7 and cities in New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin have expressed strong interest in hosting additional demonstrations.
Significantly, increasing numbers of educators have argued
that they do not need vouchers in their communities because
they are introducing choice within their school systems. It
remains to be seen whether the choices offered will reflect the
wishes of parents (even if they constitute only a minority by
race, income, or educational taste in the community) or only
those of the public school administrators. But the willingness
even to speak in favor of parental choice represents a significant
change.
The Common

School Tradition

A major obstacle still confronting the alternative movement
is our uniform common school tradition. From the earliest
recorded school law (1647 in Massachusetts) designed to outmaneuver Satan's efforts to keep men from knowledge of the
true Scripturess1 states have first offered and later forced
schooling on ever larger numbers of individuals for ever longer periods.
Initially this effort was focused on poor children. In 1787
Benjamin Rush proposed a plan for a system of free schools
for the poor children of Philadelphia. By 1804, Washington,
D.C., had established such a school system for its poor children
with Thomas Jefferson as its first school board president.
For children who were not poor, the primary responsibility
remained for a time with their parents. As late as 1827 Kent
February 1973
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"During the minority of the child ...the
parent is
bound
to
for
his
maintenance
absolutely
provide reasonably
and education; and he may be sued for necessaries furnished,
and schooling given to a child, under just and reasonable
circumstance." This obligation was not without its rewards: "In
of obligation of the father to provide for the
consequence
maintenance, and, in some qualified degree, for the education
of his infant children, he is entitled to the custody of their
persons, and to the value of their labor and services."19
But the common school doctrine soon spread to include
schools for all children, not just the poor. The first publicly
funded high school was established in 1821. By 1890 about 7
percent of 14- 17-year-olds were enrolled, and by 1930, 51
percent of this age group were in high school.20
By the 1880s the rationale for providing education focused
less on moral or spiritual fulfillment and more on maintaining
the social order:
observed:

The accumulation of riches in this country, brought about by the
rapidity of industrial and commercial movements, tends to devote
the sweat and lives of many to the few. If the elevation of the
masses does not keep pace with this materialistic progress, misery
and demoralization will increase in proportion to the augmentation of production. Communism and socialism will then claim to
be heard .... Nothing less than the State can check the prevalence
of the revolutionary ideas and the assailment of social and proprietary rights .... Shall she establish a network of police force?
This is the weakest and most unworthy of all remedies....
The
first step of the State should be to get possession of the minds of
men; get control of their ideas .... This can be accomplished by a
system of uniform, well-organized and liberally supported public
schools. ... The power of education, rightly conducted, is almost
omnipotent. It will make useful and peaceable citizens out of
ninety percent of the worst children who fall under its influence.21
It was also at this point that the shift from voluntary to compulsory schooling took place, encouraged by a desire to Americanize the flood of immigrants: "It is largely through immigration that the number of ignorant, vagrant, and criminal youth
has recently multiplied to an extent truly alarming in some of
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our cities. Their depravity is sometimes defiant and their resistance to moral suasion is obstinate. When personal effort and
persuasion and organized benevolence have utterly failed, let
the law take them in hand, first to the public school, and if
there incorrigibly, then to the Reform School."22
Initially, the compulsory education laws allowed parents a
range of choice in schooling. The 1874 New York law, for
example, specified that children aged 8- 14 could attend some
public or private school for at least fourteen weeks a year, or
be instructed at home for the same period in spelling, reading,
writing, English grammar, geography, and arithmetic.23 By
1909, however, the state required regular attendance of children aged 7- 16 at a public school conducted in English, or
equivalent instruction by a competent teacher for the same
number of hours.24
Today the common school doctrine has spread to the point
where 90 percent of all students finish at least one year of high
school and 80 percent graduate.25 It is a system in which
control of the schools is concentrated in the hands of ever
fewer educators and school boards. The number of school
districts declined from 127,531 in 1930 to less than 20,440 in
1968.26 Even at that number, the supposed diversity of the
systems is more illusory than real, especially in large cities. If
someone were placed blindfolded in an elementary school
classroom in New York, Chicago, or San Francisco, it is unlikely that he could tell one from another.
Equal Opportunity Issues
In addition to facing the steady trend toward uniform common schools, supporters of alternative schools must confront
the need to promote equality of educational opportunity endorsed by the judiciary in Brown v. Board of Education.27 Unfortunately, the Brown decision has been translated by some
into a justification for maintaining the present public system.
Racial integration is easier to administer, so the argument
goes, in a centralized system in which all schools are alike. The
right proportion of each racial group can simply be bussed to
every school.
February 1973
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There are several reasons to question this view. There is
first the issue of whether integration will be judicially required
in all public school systems to the same extent that it has been
in the South and isolated northern cities. If it is not, allowing
parents to choose voluntarily among different types of schools
may be the most important step toward more integration in
schools. Certainly if a community or nation wants to integrate,
a diversified school system need not be a hurdle. Schools could
be required to meet a particular level of racial balance as a
condition of receiving public funds.
Moveover, the 'judiciary has made it clear that publicly
funded schools must desegregate.28 Providing funds to new
and existing alternative schools could increase the overall level
of racial integration in schools29 and provide better educational opportunities for more minority students.
Indeed, the constitutional line against racial discrimination
in education is so firm that the judiciary recently withdrew the
tax-exempt status of private schools which discriminate in admissions.30 The Court dismissed arguments that such action
would conflict with contitutionally protected rights of association: "There is a compelling as well as a reasonable government interest in the interdiction of racial discrimination which
stands on highest constitutional ground."31 The Court refused
to rely on statements by the Internal Revenue Service that it
would enforce such a policy voluntarily. It also made clear that
its ruling applies to any private school practicing racial discrimination and not just to the specific Mississippi schools
mentioned in the case.
Three months later a Wisconsin federal district court followed suit and barred preferential state tax treatment, not just to
schools but to any charitable organizations which discriminate
in membership on the basis of race.32
Both these cases are important, not only for the firm stand
they take with respect to racial discrimination but because they
ease the way to a time when government focuses more on the
relations between individuals and private organizations and
less on operating services directly.
Thus, more diversity in schooling is possible without threat184
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ening equality of access. Increasing diversity may even be a
better strategy for improving educational opportunities than
simply fighting about equal access to the present public
schools. Coleman has demonstrated that current public schools
do little if anything to help poor or black children to learn as
much as their middle-class white counterparts?3 More
recently, Christopher Jenks has argued that even if school
achievements were equalized, there is little reason to believe
income or status inequalities would be offset by present public
schools.34 These gloomy conclusions do not bar the possibility
that different schools might make a significant difference, at
least in noncognitive skills, even if reading and math scores
change little.
Resolution of the problem of preventing racial discrimination leaves yet another major obstacle for alternative
school supporters. The fight for more diversity, or, as some
have phrased it, for family choice in education,35 is after all
not a fight between families and some abstract entity. Rather it
is a fight between a few families and the majority of their
community. Sometimes it is a racial minority or an income
minority; often, though, it is a minority by virtue of taste.
Many poor families approve of their present public school for,
rightly or wrongly, they consider it the best way to get their
children into the mainstream of American economic life, while
there are middle-income families who seek alternative schools
which can provide less competition or regimentation. Traditional notions of who are minorities do not always hold.
The tension between minority tastes and the majority sometimes manifests itself as a plea for following "professional
judgment." Many parents contend that some other parents
would not make use of the opportunity to choose schools even
if it were available, and therefore poor children would be
worse off than under the present system of geographic assignment by the state. A slight variation of this position is the
statement that professional educators know more than parents
about what is a good education. This is a view some professionals no doubt encourage to strengthen the need for their
services.
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Yet even if professionals could agree on what constitutes a
good school or education, professionals do not assess each
child: the process would be too unwieldy to administrate. Instead, the state matches students and schools for the most part
on the basis of residence.
Concern for the impact of choice on uninformed parents is
well founded, but the concern might better be directed to
providing parents with sufficient information to make wise
choices. The strength of the resistance even to this effort is
hard to explain. Possibly some of the resistance to allowing
parents to make educational choices-even narrow ones limited to state-approved alternatives- reflects a sex bias. Women,
at least traditionally, as closest to Johnny's experience in
school. Family choice in education would be primarily the
woman's choice. While it is true that most elementary and
many secondary school teachers are women, educational administrators, boards of education, and state legislators are
overwhelmingly men. To the extent that legislative and board
policies and admissions decisions constrain the influence of a
given teacher, favoring professional choice over family choice
in education is likely to maintain the power of male over
female in making educational choices for children.
Alternative schools may be a reform favored only by minority interests. Legislatures, therefore, are likely never to support
alternative schools. As with legislative reapportionment, the
counter-majoritarian power of the courts may be needed.
for Judicial Support
Prospects for support of alternative schools are not necessarily any better in the courts. All of the arguments against
forays into a political thicket which were raised against reapportionment are likely to be used again. The Nixon Court is
not likely to rush into such activism. There is, however, some
precedent that can be mustered in favor of judicial protection
of minority interests in education.
Initially most courts did little to counter the common school
movement. They upheld legislation to levy taxes to pay for
Prospects
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schooling36 and confirmed the right of states to prosecute
parents who did not send their children to school.37 Even then,
some state courts did protect the right of parents to pick and
choose among the curriculum offerings of the schools they
were being forced to use.38
The public school movement proceeded successfully without
judicial intervention until the early twenties. Then in several
landmark cases the Supreme Court stepped in to offer some
protection to minority interests in education.
In Meyer v. Nebraska the Court held unconstitutional a statute which prohibited teaching modern foreign languages to
any student who had not yet passed the eighth grade. The
Court observed that three rights were at issue: "the occupation
rights of modern language teachers," "the opportunities of
pupils to acquire knowledge," and "the power of parents to
control the education of their own children.""39But the case
before the Court really raised only the first issue, because it
involved an appeal of the conviction of a young teacher who
had taught German to students in a Lutheran elementary
school.40 The precedential value of the decision is, therefore,
somewhat weak, although replete with verbal kudos for minority tastes in education.
In Pierce v. Societyof Sisters,41 the Court overturned an Oregon statute (inspired by the Klu Klux Klan) which would have
required all students to attend public schools. Although the
plaintiffs this time were private schools, the Court again raised
the rights of parents and children in its opinion which contains
the modern nonpublic schools' Magna Charta: "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only."42
When Pierce was decided, no one focused much on the fact
that the "right" there established was a hollow victory for anyone unable to afford private schooling. But since Pierce, certain
rights have been singled out by the Court as so fundamental
that they must be made equally available to the poor and the
rich. These include certain criminal procedure rights,43 voting
February 1973
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rights,44 and the right to travel.45 Many have argued that
educational rights are certainly as fundamental as these
others-since the significance of the franchise, for example,
may depend as much, if not more, on education as on procedural niceties.
In the past few months an increasing number of courts have
accepted the proposition that education is such a fundamental
right.46 It is, therefore, now possible that for the first time
courts will be willing to combine the Pierce doctrine with this
expanded concern for protecting the educational rights of the
poor in a fashion that provides judicial support for alternative
schools. The judiciary might, for example, be moved to empower the poor to have their share of public education resources devoted to schools of their choice in a quasi voucher
program.47

The hypothetical suit outlined above highlights some of the
difficulties of using the equal protection clause to protect the
rights of the poor. The judiciary might simply order private
schools to admit students without regard to family income, just
as they are now moving to require private schools to admit
students without regard to race.48 But the result would be to
bankrupt most of the private schools. In other words, protecting the rights of the poor, in education as elsewhere, requires
state financial support as well as criminal sanctions if it is to
work. But ordering legislatures to appropriate money potentially infringes on the traditional separation of powers so much
that the judiciary has understandably been willing to do so
only in limited areas.
There may be more justification for the courts to order
legislatures to appropriate funds for education than in some of
the other areas where action has already been taken. Ordering
the states to provide lawyers to poor criminal defendants, for
example, entailed a new expense. An order requiring the
funding of qualified alternative schools, by contrast, would
involve simply a reallocation of funds which must otherwise be
spent for the same students in the public system. Reallocation
is not such a big step as ordering new expenditures outright,
particularly in view of the recently demonstrated judicial will188
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ingness to reallocate public education funds among public
schools within school districts,49 and among public districts
themselves.50

The courts might be reluctant however to provide control of
funds to individual families without any restrictions on how
they are used. Families might simply keep the money and
pretend to educate the children at home, or spend it in institutions which taught little. A more acceptable request in the
eyes of the judiciary, therefore, might be a joint request for
funding from parents and from the specific alternative school
of their choice. The school would have to demonstrate that it
met all state and local certification requirements before it
could become eligible for funding. An advantage of this approach is that it would create some private regulation. Several
families would have to agree on the worth of a school before a
funding request could be made. The process would guard
against the unacceptable idiosyncracies of an isolated family
where the parents did not really have the best interests of their
children at heart.
Countless hurdles to such a suit come immediately to mind.
Just how would a school prove it was "public" enough to be
entitled to public funding? Proof that religion was not taught
would probably be essential.51 A policy of nondiscriminatory
admissions would need to be shown. Compliance with state
and local education standards would have to be demonstratotal burden on the school might make
t.he Placing
ted.52
successful proof impossible. Ideally, it should be sufficient to
show prima facie compliance with existing standards. The
burden would then be on the state to show why the school
desired by this group of parents was not an acceptable
recipient of public funds.53
The one recent case to challenge the right of the state to
compel attendance at state-approved schools does not offer
much encouragement to alternative school enthusiasts. In Wisconsin v. Yoder54 the Supreme Court was asked to approve a
state court decision exempting Amish students from school
after the eighth grade. The Court upheld the decision, but it
seemed more moved by the fact that the Amish are "very
February 1973
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law-abiding members of society [who] reject public welfare in
any of its usual modern forms"55 than by any concern for
educational diversity. As Chief Justice Burger observed, "[It]
cannot be over-emphasized that we are not dealing with a way
of life and a mode of education by a group claiming to have
recently discovered some 'progressive' or more enlightened
process for rearing children for modern life.'56
Since neither legislative nor judicial support for funding
alternative schools is likely in the immediate future, the best
hope for alternative school supporters appears to be negotiating with school boards either to give some public schools
enough autonomy to remodel themselves, or to allow a few
private alternative schools in the public system whether by fiat
or contract. Subcontracts were let to private interests in specific
subjects during the abortive performance contracting experiments sponsored by the OEO. It may similarly be possible
to contract out an entire school. The danger with such incremental change, as usual, is that it may be co-opted by the
process to the point that it is no change at all.
Plato wanted guardians to rear children. We have learned
that some parents are not fit for the job, but having the state
rear all children hardly seems a better alternative. Our country
needs an intermediate institution that is more personalized
than a state system, yet more egalitarian than the old family
centered system which failed to protect some children from
their parents' negligence. Schools can perhaps be that intermediate "community," but only if individual families can
share with the state the responsibility of shaping them.

1. See the 1971 New Schools Directory Project, sponsored by HEW
and summarized by Allen Graubard in "The Free School Movement," Harvard Educational Review 42 (1972): 351.
2. In 1969 approximately five out of every six students in nonpublic
elementary schools were in Catholic schools (U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstractof the United States [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971], tables 175 and 181, pp.
116- 19 [hereafter cited as 1971 StatisticalAbstract]).
3. The semantic contortions demonstrate the inadequacy of current
definitions of public or private schools, which focus more on who runs
schools than on how they are run. Some schools run by the state, for
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23. N.Y., Congress, Laws of the State of New York,97th Cong., 1874, ch.
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